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January 17, 1964

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FROM

: INR - Thomas L. Hughes

INTELLIGENCE HOTE: KIT ISHTHEY STEACH SEEKS TO REASSURE CASTRO

KOMER of today's Kimmhchev speech in Judging from the TASS SALINGER _saunders Kalinin (a full text should be available to-merow morning), his _BCHLESINGER _smith, wm. Y main purpose was to assure Castro of the continued validity of t... U.S. non-invasion pledge. He asserted that the "understanding with the U.S. administration f on the pledge \bar{J} is still valid. While noting that Soviet rockets can reach their targets from Soviet territory he implied that if the U.S. broke its pledge the Soviet end of the bargain would loose its validity as well, i.e. that the USSR would return its rockets to Cuba. Thether Castro would derive much comfort from this latter point is questionable, but the assurance regarding the continued validity of the non-invasion pledge does seem to be something Castro was interested in hearing. At any rate, it coincides closely with what a Yugoslav correspondent reported from Havana on January 14 was one of Castro's main purposes in going to see Khrushchev.

Guantanano. In the context of a strong reaffirmation of Soviet support for the national liberation strug-le and for the "legitimate desire" of the Panamanian people to be " rid of the oppression of U.S. imperialism", Khrushchev welcomed "the Cuban people's struggle for the liquidation of the American military base in Guantanamo." (Incidentally, Khrushchev did not deny Communist involvement in Panama but merely said he did not know what part they took. The remark scemed to refer to local Communists.)

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Attack on Chinese. Khrushchev broke the hiatus in Soviet attacks on the Chinese, calling them "fools" or "children" if they are really not afraid of war, rejecting their criticism of Soviet conduct during the Cuban missile crisis and repudiating their allegation that the Soviets, in pursuing a better standard of living, were becoming bourseois. This resumption of polemics (although Khrushchev still uses the "some people" euphemism rather than calling the Chinese by name) tends to bear out recent reports that Khrushchev may be tiring of turning the other cheek to the Chinese. It may reflect, too, the kind of arguments he was presenting Castro to persuade him of the justice of the Soviet case against the Chinese.

C.I.A. "Forgeries" About Soviet Economy. Capping a week-long series of Soviet propaganda diatribes against C.I.A.'s estimates of Soviet growth rates, Khrushchev calls them forgeries and violently denies the rossibility of Soviet economic failure. He does acknowledge "present difficulties" but holds out promise of better days because of the "big chemical industry" the Soviets are building. Then "there will be no need to purchase grain from the capitalists."

Military Sufficiency. The TASS surmary contains no explicit discussion of disarmament or European issues. Khrushchev does assert the adequacy of the Soviet military arsenal for purposes of "smashing" the imperialists should they start a war. It is presumably on the basis of this that Uhrushchev argues to domestic critics the feasibility of containing military expenditures.

(F.Y.I. We will prepare a fuller analysis then the complete text becomes available.)

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